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ABSTRACT 
This paper  provides a critique of  standard theories of  money,  in 
particular  those based  on money as a medium of  exchange.  Money  is impor- 
tant hecause  of  the relationship between money and credit.  The process of 
judging credit worthiness, in  which banks play  a central role, involves the 
collection and  processing  of information.  Like many  other economic activ- 
ities involving information, these processes are not  well  described by means 
of standard production functions.  Changes in economic circumstances  can  have 
marked effects on  the relevance of previously accumulated  information and 
accordingly on  the supply of  credit.  Changes in  the availability of  credit 
may have  marked  effects on  the level of  economic activity, while changes in 
real interest rates seem  to play  a relatively minor role in economic  fluc- 
tuations. 
This alternative view  has a number of  implications for policy, both  at 
the macro-economic  level (for instance, on  the role of  monetary policy  for 
stabilization  purposes and the choice of targets) and at  the micro-economic 
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I.  Introduction 
Money  has  long  played  a  central  role  in  popular  conceptions  of 
economics-  -and  life  more  generally.  "Money  makea  the  world  go  around." 
"Money  is the root of  all evil."  These are but two aphorisms which come to 
mind. 
Professional  economists  give  money  an  equally  mixed  review.  The 
monetarists--whose  enormous popularity of the early  80's seems subsequently 
to have waned-  -place money  as a central  determinant  of economic activity. 
By  contrast,  when I  was  a  graduate  student  at  MIT,  I  was  taught  the 
classical  dichotomy,  in which the money supply did  nothing but determine  the 
price level.  Monetary  economics, as  I  was taught it by Paul Samuelaon, was 
a  seemingly  curious  course,  devoted  to explaining  why we should  not  be 
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are gratefully acknowledged. 
This  paper  is  part of a larger  research project,  undertaken  jointly 
with Bruce  Creenwald  and Andrew  Weiss,  attempting  to  construct  a  macro- 
economic  model  baaed  on  solid  micro-economic  foundations,  in  which 
considerations  of imperfect  information play a  central  role.  This work, 
sometimes  referred  to  as  New Keynesian  economics,  while  it  shares  many 
features  with  traditional  Keynesian  models,  differs  in  several  crucial 
respects.  For  a review of  the central  features  of these models,  and a 
contrast  between  the  New  Keynesian  and  New  Classical  approaches,  see 
Creenwald  and Stiglitz  [1987b].  For a survey of the empirical  evidence  in 
support of these theories, see Creenwald and Stiglitz  [l988c]. 
1 studying  the subject.  Money  had no real effects.  I was persuaded  by the 
theory. Since, as a young  idealist, I thoughr economists should be concerned 
with  matters of importance, with real variables,  I paid little  attention  in 
the following years  to monetary economics.2 
As  a  result,  I  missed  several  of  the  fads  in  empirical  monetary 
economics:  what  mattered  was  unanticipated  money;  what  mattered  was 
anticipated  money;  money  did not matter, once one had correctly  controlled 
for  short  term  interest  rates;  velocity  (correctly  calculated,  with the 
right  definition  of  money,  a  definition  which  was  itself  constantly 
changing) was or  was not constant, 
The Classical Dichotomy  Strengthened. 
The theory,  too,  progressed,  if in an  uneven  way.  Some economists who, 
in other  respects,  insisted  that models  should not be ad hoc,  that  they 
should  be based on principles  of  maximization, took the low road  around  the 
difficulties  posed  by money  by putting money  into  the utility  function  or 
the production  function--a  trick,  which  repeated  often  enough,  took on a 
semblance of  respectability!  Others  took the high road,  creating a demand 
for money by assuming that it was required for transactions, modelling  it  as 
an old  fashioned  cash  in advance constraint--criticisms  that  it was en ad 
2Monetary  economics  displayed  the  same  schizophrenia  between  micro- 
theory  and  macro-theory  that  characterized  then  (and  continues  to 
characterize)  the profession.  In  macro-economics,  we were taught  that, at 
least some of the time, money did matter.  It had real effects.  For reasons 
which  I  shall explain  later,  I  found the macro-economic  analysis  less than 
compelling. 
2 hoc assumption which was blatantly  false being  brushed aside with  the remark 
that these were topics for future research.3 
On the other  side, I  managed to strengthen considerably  the theoretical 
foundations  of  the  classical  dichotomy,  incorporating  uncertainty,  and 
showing  that  the conclusions  did not depend  either on the existence  of a 
complete Set of  markets or  even rational expectations.  Using  the approach I 
had  previously  employed  to  demonstrate  the  irrelevance  of  corporate 
financial  policy (Stiglitz  [1969,  1974)),  I  showed  that  public  financial 
policy  had no effect  (Stiglitz [1983,  l988]).  Establishing a form of  Say's 
law for govertunent  debt,  I showed  that if the government  reduced taxes  and 
increased  its debt,  the demand  for government  bonds  increased  by an amount 
exactly  equal  to  the  increase  in supply.  Not only did such  a change  in 
financial policy  have no real effects, it  had not effects on  prices either. 
Furthermore,  a change in  the  term  structure  of government  debt  had no 
effects.  This result  seemed particularly surprising,  given  the widespread 
acceptance  of the  Tobin  portfolio  approach  to monetary  economics  in which 
3Some  recent  research has attempted  to address  this criticism,  but  in 
ways which I find unconvincing.  Models are constructed where,  for instance, 
individuals only  meet  once, and hence it is impossible to establish  credit- 
worthiness.  But  even  in these circumstances,  there would  be incentives  to 
establish  credit  intermediaries.  The  fact  is  that  credit  facilitates  a 
substantial  fraction  of  all  transactions,  a  fraction  which  itself  is 
presumably  endogenously  determined.  Constructing  a model  in which  that 
fraction is, of  necessity, zero may provide limited insights into our economy. 
4Several  other  versions  of  the  irrelevance  theorem,  paralleling  the 
various versions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, were  established, e.g. by 
Wallace.  These  required somewhat more stringent  conditions,  for instance, 
the existence of  a complete set of  securities markets. 
Earlier,  simpler  versions  of public  irrelevance  theorems,  in which 
there was no uncertainty,  were popularized by Barro  [1974] ,  though  similar 
results were  proven  several years earlier in an  unpublished  paper by Robert 
Hall [1967],  and Buchanan attributes the idea to Ricardo (hence  the popular 
characterization of  the result as the Barro-Ricardo proposition.) 
3 changes  in  the  supplies  of  bonds  affect  the  level  of  investment  as  a 
consequence  of  the  general  equilibrium  effects  on  the  price  of capital 
(Tobin's  "q").  The  "mistake"5 was  that Tobin  (and others of that school) 
forgot  to include, as one element in individuals' portfolios,  the variable 
tax  liabilities.  The  probability  distribution  of these  tax  liabilities 
changes,  of course,  when the government  usdertakes  a  change  in,  say,  the 
maturity  structure  of its debt.  My analysis  took those changes explicitly 
into account. 
Of  course, like any theorem, there were  assumptions  which went into the 
analysis.  These  seemed  to be of two  sorts:  some,  like  the absence  of 
distortionary  tax  affects,  while  they would alter  the  qualitative  result 
that taxes had  effect, seemed  an implausible basis  for an  argument about 
why monetsry  policy  should  be important:  surely  its effectiveness did not 
hinge  on  the  real effects arising from the difference  in  the change in  the 
dead weight  losses from an increase in tsxes  in one year  compenssted by a 
decrease in taxes  in some later years!  Another assumption  in  the analysis 
was  the  absence  of  intergenerational  redistributive  effects.  While  one 
might  agree or  disagree with  Barro that the economy isbest modeled as a set 
of dynastic  families,  with no intergenerational  effects,  surely  run 
monetary policy  does not  hinge on  these intergenerational effects. 
The  other  set  of  assumptions--concerning  perfect  capital  markets 
(though the analysis  did not require that there be a complete  set of risk 
and  futures  markets)--wss  no different  from  that  assumed  in conventional 
i  hesitate  to call  it a mistake,  because  I  suspect,  as a behavioral 
model,  his probably  provided  a more  accurate depiction  of the economy than 
mine, which  required,  if not rational expectations, at least a certain form 
of  "consistent expectations," entailing a higher  degree of  rationality than, 
I  suspect, is commonly found. 
4 economic  models.  If that assumption  was struck  down, with it would  fall 
much  of the  standard  theory.  Of course, practical  men have long claimed 
that  the economists'  models  of the capital market were unrealistic,  and a 
host  of  institutional  economists  (and  theoretical  economists,  when they 
found  it to their convenience) have made use of the assumption  of  imperfect 
capital  markets.  But  higher  minded  economists  have looked  derisively  at 
those who made reference  to imperfect  capital  markets,  accusing  them  of, 
among other sins, ad  hocery. 
One of the most important developments in  economic  theory, however,  of 
the past  fifteen years has been  to explore the consequences  of  imperfect and 
costly  information  for  the  functioning  of  the  capital  market.  These 
studies6  have  shown  that  those  models  which  assumed  imperfect  capital 
markets  may  have been much closer  to the  mark than  those  which,  on the 
contrary,  assumed  perfect  capital marketa.  These  studiea  have shown  that 
capital  markets  that  are  competitive--in  the  sense  which  that word  is 
commonly used-  -may be characterized  by credit  and equity  rationing.  These 
models not only  provide explanations of  institutional details of  the capital 
market,  details  which  are  either  inconsistent  with the  perfect  capital 
market models  or about which they  have  nothing to say; but they also provide 
a  basis  of an  explanation of  macro-economic  (aggregative) behavior which are 
also  inconsistent  with the  conventional  neoclassical  model.  It  is  not, 
however, my  purpose here to provide a review of these results. 
5The  literature  is,  by now,  voluminous.  Among  the  commonly  cited 
atudiea are Rosa  [19]]]  ,  Leland  and Pyle  [19]]]  ,  Stiglitz  [1982]  ,  Stiglitz 
and Weiss  [1981,  1983,  1986,  1988],  Greenwald, Stiglitz,  and Weiss  [1984], 
and Myers  and Majluf  [1984].  Empirical studies include thoae by  Aaquith and 
Mullins [1983] and Schliefer  [1986]. 
5 I  have  now come  to believe  that  monetary  inatitutions  and policy do 
have important  real effects,  but  for reasona quite  different  from those of 
the standard  theory.  My objective in this talk is to explain both why it is 
that  monetary policy  is--sometimes--effective  and  why  the  conventional 
explanations  of  the mechanism by  which  it works-  -particularly those versions 
based on the transactions  demand for money7  -- are inadequate,  though there 
may be some slight grains of  truth in these conventional explanations. 
II.  A Critique of  Transactions Based Traditional Monetary Theory 
There  are  several  reasons  why  one  might  be  suspicious  of  the 
traditional  explanations.  The past fifteen years  hss witnessed  remarkable 
chsnges  in transactions  technologies.  Computers  enable  the velocity  of 
circulation  to  become  virtually  infinite, for instance, in the use of money 
msrket  accounts.  The relationship between conventionally  messured money and 
income, while it  has not been stable in  recent years, hss not moved in  a way 
that a trsnsactions-based  theory would have  predicted. 
More fundamentally,  most transactions are exchanges of  assets, snd are 
not relsted  directly  to the production of income.  And there is no a priori 
reason to  expect  that  the  relationship  between  the  two,  the  volume  of 
exchanges  of  assets  and  the  level  of income, should  be stable.  Indeed, 
there is reason  to  believe that  in periods of  rapid change, such as when  the 
economy  is  going  into  a  recession,  there  will be  large  differences  in 
opinions  concerning  future  prospects  of  the  economy,  as  well  as  large 
The theoretical  and empirical objections  to the real balance effects 
are perhaps slightly better  known and, I think, equally telling. 
The  one  approach  which  I  find  aomewhst  persuasive  is  the  Tobin 
portfolio  approach,  but,  as  I  noted  above,  that approach  faces  certain 
difficulties.  The theory we  present below resolves some those difficulties. 
6 changes  in relative  net wealth  positions,  leading  to corresponding  larger 
than  normal  exchanges  of  assets.  Of  course,  many,  if not  most,  asset 
exchanges  may  not  entail  money  (or may  entail  money  with a much higher 
velocity  than transactions involving labor services.)  But that is exactly 
my  point:  transactions do  not require money, only credit. 
Furthermore, with the recent  growth  of interest bearing  accounts,  the 
poxtunitv cost of  holding  money  has, by and large, become  the difference 
between  the  interest rate paid on money market  accounts  and those paid on 
other  short  term financial  instruments--a  difference which  is,  for economic 
purposes,  minuscule.  It  is this  interest rate  differential  which should 
appear  in the money  demand equation  (and in  the LM  curves of  macro-economic 
analysis.)  It stretches  the credulity  of even the most  hardened Keynesian 
to believe  that  monetary  policy  operates  through changes  in  the gg  value 
of this  interest  rate differential.  Of course,  in a general  equilibrium 
system, any exogenous change will  have  affects throughout  the system.  Were 
the government  to buy up peanuts  and burn  them, it  would have  real effects 
on  output, investment, and employment.  But though there is a long tradition 
in  macro-economics  on  focusing  on  third and fourth  order effects-  -  dating at 
least  back to the real balance  effect-  -  there  is a consensus  that a peanut 
theory of  macro-economic  policy will  not do;  so too should a theory based  on 
changes  in the  differential  between  money  market  accounts  and short  term 
government  bills be looked upon with suspicion,  though  there may indeed be 
links between this differential and the appropriate  long term real interest 
rates, and  between those interest rates and the level of investment. But even that last  link is suspect; or,  to put it more accurately,  it 
does  not  seem plausible  that  variations  in long term real  interest  rates 
have played an  important  role in  fluctuations  in  investment.  It  is hard  to 
know,  of course, what the relevsnt real  interest rates are.  We have time 
series  for nominal  interest rates  for loans of  various msturities,  but what 
is relevant  for  mn investor  (in the  traditional  theory),  mt the  time  he 
makes  his decisions,  is the real  interest rate,  and to calculate  this, he 
must form  a forecast  of  future prices.  (This would  not be true, of  course, 
if  all loans were appropriately  indexed.)  As a first pass at  this problem, 
Dwight Jaffee and I  [1988] looked  at the realized  real rates  of interest. 
We constructed  a time  series for what the real rate of interest would  have 
been on five year indexed government  bonds  (so we can ignore variations  in 
rates  of default), assuming  the market acted jf  it had  perfect foresight 
and was risk neutral.  Suth a hypothetical  rate would  have been the  rate 
that  would--in  neoclassical  models  without equity and credit  rationing--be 
relevant  for  investment  decisions  in five year  machines.  Though  there has 
been some secular changes in  this real interest rate, rising  in the 80's to 
record  heights,  there  is  virtually  no  relationship  between  this,  the 
relevant real interest rate, and the level of investment.  (Similar results 
bold  for the ten year  real interest rate.)  With  a few exceptions--the Great 
Depression  and the l980's--one might as well  treat the real interest rate  as 
a  constant.  And constants  do not  provide  a  basis  of a good  theory  of 
fluctuations. 
This  is not  surprising,  given businessmen's  accounts of how they make 
investment  decisions.  Though  interest rates  enter  the calculations,  they 
conventionally  require (expected) real returns of  15,  20,  or 25% before  they 
8 undertake  a project;  given  the uncertainties associated with all aspects of 
long term investment projects,  a variation  in  the real interest rate from  3 
to 4%  is absorbed in  rounding error. 
The skepticism  that we  have expressed here and elsewhere about the role 
of interest  rates has,  of course, been implicitly or explicitly  shared  by 
monetarists.  They have  noted  the  regularity between  the money supply  and 
the  level  of output,  with interest  rates  seemingly  playing  a  relatively 
minor  role.  Leaving  to  theorists  the  task  of explaining  this sometime 
regularity,  they  have  been content  to base  policy  prescriptions  on  the 
persistence  of  this  relationship,  to argue  that  if only  we increase  the 
supply of money,  output will go  up.  The  failure of this prescription  to 
work in the 80's  should  not detract  us from  the essential  insight  of the 
monetarists-  -the  seeming  unimportance  over  long  periods  of  time  of  the 
interest rate. 
There are further objections  to the transactions based theory  of  money: 
when Ireland  faced  a  strike  which  closed  down  the clearing  mechanisms  for 
checks, while  the transactions based theories might have suggested  that the 
economy would  have come to a screeching halt,  alternative  arrangements were 
easily worked out,  and  the  effects  were  indeed  limited.  Italy  hds 
periodically  gone  through  periods  of  shortages  of  small  currency,  with 
little  impediment  in trade,  the major  effect  perhaps  being  the  increased 
number of cavities  resulting  from the slightly  larger  number of pieces  of 
candy consumed, as candy became  conventionally used  for small change. 
9 The Survival Power of a Bad Theory 
I have thought hard  about  the question of  how could a theory with such 
seeaing  little  prospect  for  explaining  major  macro-economic  events  gained 
such  widespread  populsrity.  (If bad msnagers  had  sn ability  to  survive 
comparable  to thst of bad economic theories,  the capitalist economic  system 
would  indeed  be  faced  with  problems!)  There  are  three  possible 
explanations. 
1.  Money  as an  Accounting  Device in  Simple Games and Primitive Economies. 
One  of  the  lessons  we have learned  from Freudian  psychology  is  the 
importance of  going back  to events of  our childhood if  we wish  to  understand 
our  neuroses,  our obsessions, and the way we  misperceive  the world.  Most  of 
us when we were children played  simple games, in  which play  money  was used. 
In playing  monopoly,  if we wanted to buy  a house  or hotel  or a  piece  of 
property,  we had to have money-  -we could not buy on credit.  There  was  a 
cash-in-advance  constraint; money was the medium  of  exchange. 
Money  served  s  second  function:  it was  the method by which  we kept 
score.  The person  with the most  money sc  the end of  the gsme was declared 
the winner. 
Later  on,  most of us  pass on  to more complicated  games, such as  bridge, 
where  there are alternstive ways  of  keeping score. 
Similarly,  primitive economies need  a simple accounting  scheme.  Since 
the  expulsion  from Eden,  all  economies have needed  some method  of keeping 
track of what  esch individual  contributes to and takes out of the economy. 
Primitive  economies use money  (M0)  as their accounting  device. 
10 But even  in  simple economies,  there is s realization  that there may not 
be  an  intertemporal  coincidence  of  wants.  There  are  gains  from 
intertemporal  trades.  Intertemporal  trsdes  require credit: one  individual 
gets more  than he has -  -  up  to that point  in time -- "earned"  the right to, 
in return  for  s promise  to pay back  some of his  future  earnings.  Hence, 
even  primitive  economiea drop the cash-in-advance  constraint. 
In modern  economies,  the task of  determining who is credit worthy, who 
is likely  to repay a loan, is both  more important and more difficult than  in 
primitive  economies.  It is not only that  (to use Bohm  Bawerk's term) round 
about  means  of production  are more productive,  but there  is a  separation 
between  entrepreneurship  and capital:  those with the best  ideas for using 
resources  are  not necessarily  those who have control of reaourcea.  It is 
not surprising  then  that  institutions have developed  to ascertain  who  is 
credit  worthy  (and  indeed  different  institutions  specialize  in evaluating 
different  kinds  of  risk.)  Banks  are  among  the  moat important  of  these 
institutions. 
Banks  can thus be viewed  as social accountants--keeping  the records  of 
what  individuals  contribute  to  and  take  out  of  society- 
-  and  screening 
devices.  (See Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988a.) 
Though  the  "model" of money which  is derived from  childhood games  and 
primitive  economies  is not a good  model of  our credit  economy, there  is one 
important  lesson  to  be  derived  from  it.  Even in our  more  developed 
economies,  money  is pgfl.of our system of  accounts,  of  ascertaining who has 
rights  to  reaourcea.  If  the  government  should  print  money  to  finance 
deficits,  this will interfere  with our accounting  ayatem.  The  claims  on 
resources,  at existing  prices,  will  exceed  the  supply  of  resources,  and 
11 inflation  will result.8  On the  other hand,  if the government  borrowa  to 
finance government  deficita,  there is no necessary increase in the supply of 
current  claims  on resources;  individuals  simply  trade with the  government 
their  rights  to  current  resources  for  rights  to  future  resources.  Of 
course,  the  increase  supply of government  debt may provide  the basis of a 
general  expansion  of credit  (a monetary  expansion) by the banking  system, 
but it need  not do so.  The fact that the banking system may extend  more or 
less credit  than is required to  attain full employment at  stable prices  is a 
more general problem, which we discuss below. 
2.  Sunk  Costs of  General Equilibrium Theory. 
Let me now turn to the second possible  explanation of the persistence 
of the  transactions-based  view of  money.  In spite of the sermon that  we 
preach  to our students  about letting by-gones be  bygones,  end ignoring past 
sunk costs  in making future  investments,  there  is  considerable  evidence 
that  businessmen  do  not  behave  this way--nor  do we  academics.  Having 
invested en enormous amount of intellectual capital in learning the general 
equilibrium  model, we want to  apply  it wherever we can.  A simple change of 
notation from  C for conaumption or  x for output to  M for money and we have  s 
theory  of money.  Monetary  economics becomes  the  study  of the  demand  and 
supply  curves for money, just like  agricultural economics  is the study  of 
the demand and supply for the output of  farms.  Of  course, if we  pursued the 
analogy  further, we might  have  thought  that there would be more than just 
8Similarly, when gold was  at the center of the accounting  ayatem, an 
increase  in the supply  of gold  (as  a  reault of the discovery  of new gold 
deposits)  constituted a disruption  to the accounting ayatem.  The supply of 
"claims" on  resources was  increased, without  a commensurate  increase in  the 
supply of  resources.  Inflation again resulted. 
12 the estimation  of demand and supply  functions;  there  would  have been an 
interest  in  understanding  the  underlying  technology,  of  examining  the 
transactions technology and the relationship between  that technology and the 
demand  for  money.  Students  of  money  and  finance  who  are  not  macro- 
economists  do study in  detail  the financial institutions,  but they study the 
instruments with which  credit  gets extended, not by which transactions  get 
recorded. 
Credit as information. 
It is remarkably  difficult  to incorporate  credit within  the  standard 
general  equilibrium  model.  Credit  can be created with almost  no input  of 
conventional  factors, and credit  can equally easily  be destroyed.  There  is 
no easy way to  represent the supply function for credit. 
The  reason for  this  is  simple;  credit  is based on  information. 
Ascertaining  that an individual  is  credit worthy requires  resources;  and 
standing by  that judgment,  providing  or guaranteeing  credit, entails risk- 
bearing.  But there  is no simple  relationship between  these economic costs 
and the amount  of credit  extended. 
The physical  capital with  which  we produce in  our factories and fields 
may be slightly affected by  outside disturbances-  -rain may lead to rust-  -but 
only major  cataclysms,  such as wars,  can have a significant  effect in the 
short run.  But informational capital can be far more easily lost.  Changes 
in relative  prices  may require a drastic  reevaluation  of individuals  and 
firms' credit worthiness. 
13 Interest Rates  Are  Nor  like Conventional  Prices  and  rhe Capital Market  is 
not like an  Auction Market 
The  standard  general  equilibrium  model  is not only not  helpful  for 
understanding  credit  markets;  it  may  be  positively  misleading.  It  is 
misleading  because we are apt to  think of the price of  credit-  -  the  interest 
rate--being a price  like any one other price,  and that it adjusts to  clear 
the market. 
The interest rate is not like a conventional price.  It  is a promise to 
pay an amount  in the future.  Promises are often broken.  If they  were  not, 
there would  be no issue in determining credit worthiness.  As Andy  Weiss and 
I  [1981} have shown,  raising  the  rate  of interest  may not  incresse  the 
expected  return to a loan;  at higher  interest  rates  one  obtains  a  lower 
quality set of applicants  (the adverse selection effect)  and each of  one's 
applicants  undertakes  greater risks  (the adverse  incentive effect).  These 
effects  are  sufficiently  strong  that  the net return  may be lowered as the 
bank increases  the  interest  rate charged:  it does not pay  to charge high 
interast  rates.  Market  equilibrium  may  be  characterized  by  credit 
rationing. 
An  Analogy.  The fact  chat the credit market  is fundamentally different  from 
a  conventional  market  for  goods  should  be  familiar  to  us  from  another 
context.  None of the private universities  in the US--even  those, such as 
Harvard,  Stanford,  Yale,  Princeton,  and  Northwestern,  where  first  race 
economists  have  served  as President, provost,  and deans-  -has  employed  the 
price  system to allocate  the scarce number of places  for students.  Let me 
remind you of how  we  often talk  about the auction for credit working:  those 
14 who have the best projects  are willing  to pay  the highest  interest rstes, 
and  thus  the auction  market ensures  that  the best  projects- 
-  and  only  the 
best projects-  -get funded,  Of  course, we recognize the possibility  of human 
error.  But  then  we  say,  if  the  individual  makes  a  mistake  in  over- 
estimating  the return, he  bears the cost. 
Similar  language  could  apply  to  an  auction  for  places  in  our 
Universities.  Those with the highest return  to a Stanford  degree would bid 
the highest,  thus  ensuring  that  the value  added  of our scarce  university 
resources is maximized.  Of  course, there is a possibility  of  someone over- 
estimating the value of a Stanford degree, but if  the individual makes  such 
a mistake,  he bears  the costs.  Lack of  capital should  be no problem:  the 
University would  simply take an IOU. 
Put  in  this  way,  we  can  immediately  see  the  fallacies  in  this 
reasoning.  Students  who  bid  too much will  default  on their  IOU--just  as 
those  who  bid  too high an interest  rate  on their  loan  applications  will 
default.  Not  only  cannot we rely on individuals' judgments,  there may be 
reasons to believe  that  those who are willing  to bid particularly high are 
more likely  to default.  The  bank or the University--not  the borrower  or 
student--bears at  least some of the costs of these misjudgments.  The scarce 
resources  would not be used in a  way  which  maximized  value  added.  The 
auction  system would result  in the universities  being flooded  with  those 
overconfident  and  cocky  students who  are  so  unpleasant  to  teach,  combined 
with  those  natural  charlatans  and  cheaters,  who  feel  no  more  moral 
compunction  about  defaulting  on  their  student  loans  than they  would on 
cheating on an  exam. 
15 So  too in credit  markets:  in the face of  uncertain prices, wages,  and 
interest rates,  the return  to a project  depends as much on expectations of 
those future prices as it does on  the physical  outputs.  Those who are most 
willing to  bid high  for a loan are those who are most  optimistic  about these 
future prices  and are least risk  averse, and/or  for whom  the cost  of  default 
is lowest.  But  there  is no reason  to believe  that  allocating  credit  to 
these  individuals  maximizes  either  the private  return  to the bsnk,  or the 
social return to  society. 
Just ss  universities  spend  resources  screening  applicmnts,  so  too 
banks  spend resources  screening  mpplicsnts.  The  screening  is  far  from 
perfect, yet some  screening  is far preferable  to  none.  Prices  (or in  this 
case,  interest  rates)--market  auctions--do  not  provide,  by themselves,  an 
adequate screening mechanism. 
Credit and Equity kationing 
The informational  problems, about which  I have  just  spoken, may easily 
give  rise  to credit  rationing.  Recall,  sgsin,  the  conventional  stories: 
when there  is  an excess  demand  for credit,  an unsatisfied  borrower  offers 
the bank m higher  interest  rate.  As interest rates  thus rise,  the demand 
for  credit  decreases,  and  the  supply  incremses,  until  equilibrium  is 
attained.  But  now,  consider  what happens  if,  at  the  interest  rate which 
maximizes  the bank's  expected return, there  is an  excess  demmnd  for credit. 
The bank would  refuse a customer who offers to pay a higher  interest race, 
reasoning chat he is (on "average") a bad risk.  The expected return to such 
a loan would be lower than  for loans the bank  is currently making. 
16 Banks  will,  of course,  change  the  interest rate which  they charge  as 
economic circumstances  change.  But there is no simple  relationship between 
the interest rate charged-  -or even the interest rate paid depositors- 
-  and 
the state of the economy.  As the economy goes into a boom,  the returns to 
all  projects  may increase,  and one  might  be tempted  to argue  that  as  a 
consequence  the real  rate of interest ought to  rise, presenting  a quandary, 
since  in g  instances-  -such  as  the Great  Depression-  -the  real  interest 
rate moved  counter cyclically  rather  than pro-cyclically.  But Weiss  and I 
l988] have shown  that there may be important instances,  where  the returns 
to say risky projects  increase relative  to safe projects  in  some booms, in 
which  banks'  optimal interest rate (and accordingly, the market  equilibrium 
interest rate charged  borrowers)  actually  falls.  And it is even possible 
that  it falls  by enough that  the  real  return  to depositors  falls,  even 
though  the expected  default probability  has fallen.  Though  total expected 
rates  of return have  increased,  that  fraction  of  total  returns  which 
lenders, with  conventional debt  contracts, can appropriate decreases so much 
that their expected return  is lowered. 
Not  only  may  these  informational  problems  give  rise  to  credit 
rationing,  they may also  give rise  to what Bruce Greenwald  and I have called 
equity  rationing  (Greenwald  and  Stiglitz,  l987a,b,  l988ab).  Because  of 
adverse selection9  and moral  hazard'°  effects,  the cost of issuing equity 
9That is, the original owners-managers  of  firms are more informed about 
their  firm's  expected  return  than potential  purchasers  of shares. At any 
given  price  of  equity,  those  with the  lowest  expected  returns  are  most 
willing to sell their shares.  See Stiglitz [1982], Greenwald,  Stiglitz, and 
Weiss  [1984], and Meyers  and Majiuf  [1984). 
'0Because the managers  only receive a fraction of the returns to  their 
entrepreneurial  efforts,  their  incentives  are  attenuated.  See  Stiglitz 
[1974]  or Ross  [1973]. 
17 is sufficiently  great  that most  firms act asif they were equity rationed.1' 
When they are denied  bank credit, they  do not raiae capital by issuing new 
equity,  but  rather  constrain  their  capital  expenditures  to  reteined 
earnings. 
12  Equity  rationing  is particularly  important,  because  it means 
that  firms  cannot  divest  themselves  of the  risks  which  they  face;  the 
original  owners  cannot  fully  share  the  risks  throughout  the  economy,  and 
accordingly  the  firm  does not  act in a risk neutral manner.  (Of course, 
there are other reasons to believe that firms will  not act in  a risk  neutral 
manner.  In  large  corporations,  decisions  are  made  by  managers,  whose 
compensation  almost always is partially contingent on  the performance of  the 
firm.  Such contingency  pay  is  viewed to  be  necessary  to  provide  the 
requisite managerial  incentives.) 
Credit  and  equity  rationing,  or  more  broadly,  the  informational 
problems  associated  with  the capital market,  provide  insights  into  two of 
the puzzles we have  noted above.  j, as we have  asserted, tredit rationing 
is,  at  least  at  times,  important,  it would  explain  both why corporate 
financial  policy  is  irrelevant  and why public  financial policy  is pp 
irrelevant.  It  would  also  explain  our  findings  concerning  the  seeming 
unimportance  of real interest rates.  When the economy is credit rationed, 
it is the quantity of  loans, not the interest rates which are charged, which 
is critical.  But  even  when  the  economy  is not  credit  rationed,  equity 
rationed  firms may not be  willing  to  borrow,  given that they cannot divest 
12For evidence  on  this, see Asquith and Mullins  [1983]. 
'2There  is  another  possible  explanation  for  this  behavior: 
discontinuities  in the  marginal  cost  of raising  funds  resulting  from the 
differential  treatment  of different  forms  of finance  by tax  authorities. 
See Stiglitz  [1973). 
18 themselves  of the  risk associated  with production  and investment  (in  the 
absence  of perfect  futures markets.)  Thus,  in a recession,  increasing  the 
supply of funds available may have little effect on  investment-  -providing a 
theoretical  justification  for the  traditional  characterization  of monetary 
policy at such  times as pushing  against a stting. 
3.  A Seeming Empirical Regularity 
The third, and to my  mind, most  credible reason  for the survival of the 
conventional  monetary  model  is the seeming  regularity  of the relationship 
between  money  and  income,  a regularity  which  called  out  for a  theoretical 
explanation.  The transactions based  model seemed to  provide  an  explanation 
for  this  seeming  regularity,  though  one  which,  we have argued,  is  both 
incomplete--it  does not explain  !qhy money  is  required for transactions,  it 
simply  assumes  it-  -and wrong,  since money  is in fact not required.  It is 
not a serious advance in  economic theory simply to assume-  -counterfactually- 
-that  cash is required  in advance,  rather  than  to assume  a money  demand 
function takes  on a particular  form.  The former seems no less ad  hoc than 
the  latter,  and  the  latter-  -for  an appropriately  specified  function-  -at 
least has the possibility of  being  correct. 
The  disadvantages  of using  reduced  form  relations  are,  by now,  well 
known:  one cannot use such models  to analyze "regime changes."  But can one 
have  much reliance  on the  predictions  of a  theory based on the  obviously 
unsatisfactory  assumption  of the cash-in-advance constraint?  13 
131  really  do not  want  to  single  out  a  particular  model.  Similar 
objections  can be  raised  against models in  which,  for  instance,  monetary 
policy exercises  its effects through real balance effects. 
19 Summary 
Let me pause  for a moment to  review where we are in the argument.  We 
have  contended  that  (a)  the  transactions  based theory  of  money  is 
implausible;  that  even  if  there  were  a  stable  relationship  between 
"transactions"  and  "income,"  such  a  theory  would at  best  explain  the 
differential between  the return on a money market  account and on a treasury 
bill;  it would  not explain  the real rate of interest;  (b)  that even if it 
were  shown  that  monetary policy  affected the real rate of  interest, there  is 
little  reason to believe  that  variations  in real  rates of  interest have 
played en  important  role  in  investment  variability;  (c)  informational 
imperfections  can  explain  rigidities  in  real  interest  rates,  equity 
rationing,  and credit  rationing;  they provide a theoretical  explsnation  for 
what,  in the  older  institutional  literature,  was  casually  referred  to as 
"imperfect  capital markets";  (d) in  particular,  it is insppropriste to view 
the credit  market  with  the same tools and perspectives as employed to  study 
markets  for conventional  goods  and services;  it should not be viewed  as an 
auction market;  (e)  rsther, it  is a  market  in which allocations sre made  on 
bases  other  than  "price"; and (f)  banks  serve  m  critical  role  as social 
accountants and screening devices for the allocation of  credit. 
I have,  perhaps, been  more forceful in  pointing out the defects in  the 
competing  theories  thsn I have in providing  a complete  explanation of the 
mechanisms  by which monetary  policy  and  credit mechanisms  work  within our 
framework.  Let me turn  to this now. 
20 III.  A Closer Look at the Allocation of  Credit 
Though  we have  provide a theoretical rationale  for the widely  observed 
phenomena  of  credit and equity  rationing, many  of  the consequences  (which we 
are  about  to deacribe)  hold regardless  of the  explanation  of credit  and 
equity rationing. 
Consequences  of credit  rationing:  role  of interest  rates.  We have 
already  noted  one  consequence:  that  investment  may depend  less  on  the 
interest  rate  charged  than on the  availability  of  credit.  Changes  in 
availability  of credit  may be  much  more  marked than changes  in interest 
rates  charged.  Indeed, there may be no simple  relationship between credit 
conditions  (e.g. the riskiness of the environment), credit availability,  and 
the interest rate charged.  (Stiglitz and Weiss, l987b) 
Consequences of  credit rationing:  need  for central bank.  We have  also 
noted  a second consequence:  that because  interest  rates are  not used to 
equilibrate  the  demand and supply  for funds,  the decentralized  system  of 
credit  allocation  of  capitalist  economies14  may  result  in  discrepancy 
between  the two at full employment  levela of output.  One can view central 
banks  as  a  substitute  for  prices (interest  rates)  as  an  equilibrating 
mechanism. 
1echanisms  by  which  central banks affect  credit availability.  In the 
theory we have put  forward,  the  central bank affects  the availability  of 
credit  both  through effects on  the willinaness  and ability of banks to  make 
loans.  When banks  have  no  free  reserves,  then  monetary  policy  operates 
through  its  effect  on  banks'  ability  to  make  loans:  it  changes  the 
14We  should  emphasize  that  there  are  good  reasons  for  this 
decentralization,  associated  with the wide dispersal  of information.  See 
below. 
21 constraint.  On the other hand,  when banks have  free reserves  (as they did 
in  the Great Depression), monetary policy operates through banks willingness 
to make loans.  One  important  aspect of this which  to date has  received 
insufficient attention  is described below. 
Consequences  of  equity rationing:  risk averse behavior.  A  major 
consequence  of  equity  rationing  is  that  firms  may  act  in  a risk averse 
manner.  Equity rationing limits  the extent  to which the firms' risks  can be 
shared.  The fact  that future markets  are incomplete and there are lags in 
production  means  that every  production,  employment, and investment  decision 
is a risk decision.15  Accordingly,  changes  in either  the  risks  faced  by 
firms,  or in  firms  ability  to  absorb  risks,  will affect  all  of  these 
decisions of  the firm.  Thus, an increase in  the degree of  uncertainty  about 
future  economic  prospects  may  lead  firms  to  reduce  their  level  of 
production;  and a worsening  in a firm's balance  sheet  (its net worth) will 
lead  it to  undertake  less investment and production. 
Interactions  between  equity  and  credit  rationing  and  their 
consequences.  There  are  some  important  interactions  between  credit  snd 
equity  rationing.  First,  firm's  most  serious  fears  are  associated  with 
bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy  is determined  not  just by cash  flows.  Firms  go 
bankrupt  when they aske losses 4  cannot  find lenders willing  to lend  to 
them.  The fear of future credit  rationing  is one  reason  that  firms  act 
conservatively  today. 
'5There are other possible explanations for why firms might behave  in a 
risk  averse  manner;  the  principal  agent  literature  has  stressed  the 
importance  of providing managerial  incentives; sny incentive structure must 
have managerial  rewards  depending  significantly  on firm performance;  this 
may lead  to risk  averse behavior on  the part of  managers. 
22 Secondly,  most  firms  sre  not  only engaged  in production,  but slso in 
lending.  They sre mini-banks.  The  reason  that firms so frequently  reject 
Polonius'  sdvice shout "neither a lender nor a borrower be--and become both 
lenders and borrowers--is  simple:  information  in our  economy  is diffuse. 
Suppliers  have  information  about  their  customers  that  others do not have, 
and  customers  have  information  about  their  suppliers  that  others  do  not 
have.'6  This  lending activity  is,  however  risky.  Thus, when a firm's  net 
equity position is worsened or when  a firm's sources of funds are restricted 
(it is credit  rationed)  or when a firm's perception of the risk  of lending 
is increasing,  firm's will reduce their lending activities. 
Thirdly,  banks  are  like  firms:  their  production  activity  is  the 
screening  of  loan applicants.  And just as firms are risk averse, so  too are 
banks.  A reduction  in their  net worth  (equity) or an increase  in their 
perception  of  the  risk  associated  with  making  loans  reduces  their 
willingness  to make loans. 
Multiplier  effects.  In our  previous  discussion  we have shown  the 
market  economies will be characterized by  price  (interest rate) rigidities'7 
and credit  interlinkages  (both directly among  firms,  and between  firma  and 
banks).  This  results  in  the  economic  system  exhibiting  at  times 
instabilities; small disturbances are amplified through a multiplier  process 
'6mere are other reasons for the interlinking of  production  and credit 
activities,  having  to  do with moral  hazard  (the  chance  of  a  defective 
product.)  The credit provided by a supplier can be thought of, in part, as 
a  guarantee.  More generally,  certain externalities  associated  with moral 
hazard  frequently  give rise to interlinking of  markets.  See Braverman  and 
Stiglitz  (1982) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988). 
17  In  related  work,  we  have  shown  how  the  labor  market  will  be 
characterized  by wage rigidities  (the efficiency  wage hypothesis)  and the 
product market  may be  characterized by  price rigidities.  See, e.g. Stiglitz 
(1984, 1985a, 1986, 1987a,b) and Shapiro and Stiglitz  (1984). 
23 which  is  quite  distinct  from the traditional  Keynesian  multiplier  process 
(or more  accurstely,  contains that process as only one element.) 
(The  distinction  of how  the  economy  is  envisaged  to  respond  to 
disturbances  is another  example of the marked  dispsrity  between  macro  and 
micro  economics.  Traditional  micro-theory,  while  it  recognizes  the 
difficulties  of proving  stsbility,  begins  with  a downward  sloping  demand 
curve  and an upward  sloping supply curve, in which  a disturbance  to either 
is  dampened  through  adjustments  of prices.  The  market  economy  does  not 
amplify disturbances, but dampens them.) 
Perhaps  the beat  way to contrast our perspective with the traditional 
one is to trace out the consequences of  some disturbance-  -an increase in  the 
uncertainty  associated with  the demand for some good that s country exports- 
-both  in our  theory  and  in the trsditional  theory.  In the models of the 
true believers,  a mean  preserving increase in uncertsinty, that is one which 
does  not  change  the  expected  return,  would have no  affect  on  current 
investment,  since  all  firms  are  fully  diversified.  (A reduction  in  the 
expected  return would  ,  of  course,  lead  to s decrease  in the  demand  for 
investment,  leading  to a  decline  in  real  interest  rates;  the  subsequent 
reduction  in  savings would quickly restore equilibrium.) 
In  our theory, risk averse  firms (recall, our theory explains why firms 
should  act  in s risk averse  manner) would  be less willing  to produce  and 
invest.  This  reduction  in  investment  then has  further  repercussions. 
Prices  for  the  investment  goods  the firm would  otherwise  have  bought  are 
lower  (than  they  would  otherwise have been,  and  lower  than  the firms  had 
expected.)  The  consequent  reduction  in profits  erodes  the equity base of 
these  firms,  who,  in turn,  become  less willing to invest.  Furthermore,  a 
24 fraction  of these firms(if  the original disturbance  was  large enough) will 
go bankrupt.  The  increased  bankruptcy  leads  to petceptions  of increased 
uncertainty  associated with making  loans  (both on the part  of banks and of 
firma making  loans to suppliers and customers). 
We now have  third round effects.  These  are of two forms.  The reduced 
investment  of the  suppliers  of firma  has  further effects,  mlong  the  same 
lines  as  the original  disturbance.  In addition,  the  (higher)  bmnkruptcy 
rate means  than banks'  net equity position is deteriorated. 
One  can view banks  like conventional firms.  The businesa  of  banks  is 
making  loans;  they  "invest"  in  cultivating  clients  and  screening 
applications.  When their net equity position  is reduced, they  become  less 
willing  to make  loans. 
We now turn to the central role of the banks.  For simplicity,  assume 
that  borrowers  can be  classified  into  three  categories,  "good"  "OK"  and 
"bad"  riaka.  The bank knows  that it places  firms  into  these  categories 
imperfectly,  with some good risks being  classified  as bad, and some  bad as 
good,  etc.  All good loans are, nonetheless,  granted, no bad loans,  and-- 
depending  on  the availability  of credit--only  some  OK loans.  Again,  for 
simplicity, we aasume all borrowera apply for the same size loan.  (If truly 
good borrowers  always applied to larger  (or  smaller) loans,  that would  be a 
aignal, and the interest rate would be lower to reflect the higher  quality. 
But that could not be an  equilibrium.'8) 
18We  are  focusing,  in  other  words,  on  what  is  called  a  pooling 
equilibrium.  One can construct equilibria in which contracts with differing 
terms,  e.g.(loan  size,  intereat rate)  can  serve  as  the basis  of a  self- 
selection  (separating) equilibrium. 
25 How does the disturbance we  have just described affect  the bank in its 
central  function as a screening  device.  First,  the greater uncertainty  is 
likly  to lead  to greater errors in  classification.  This is likely  to  lower 
the expected return of  loans to those classified as "good" and perhaps  those 
classified  as OK.  Accordingly,  interest rates  charged would  have to  rise 
for  the  bank to obtain  the  same  expected  return.  Secondly,  the  greater 
uncertainty  of  returns  lowers  the  expected  return  to  the  bank,  at  any 
interest  rate, for any (correctly classified) borrower  (Stiglicz and Weiss, 
1981), again  necessitating  charging a  higher  interest rate to obtain a given 
expected return. 
Firms do  not, of  course, need  to invest all that  they borrow  inside  the 
firm;  they can hold additional  liquid  reserves  (treasury  bills),  and the 
bank  cannot observe precisely  what the borrowers do with  the funds. 
Then even  if  the overall supply of  credit were to have remained fixed, 
the level of  investment would  decrease, for several reasons. 
Firms  that  are  classified  as  good  are  likely  to  reduce  their 
investment, both because  of the  increased risk and because  of the higher 
interest  rate  being  charged.19  Furthermore,  misclassifications  lead to 
reduce  investment:  the  good firms  that are classified  as OK reduce  their 
investment  more  than  the  bad firms  that  are  classified  as  good  increase 
theirs.  Indeed, the good firms that are classified as OK  may choose not to 
borrow at  all, rather  than pay the high interest rates associated with  such 
loans. 
15The  good  firms  face  an  increase  in  interest  rates  more  than 
commensurate with  the increased risk of  default associated with their loans. 
26 Note that  in this perspective, there are two different senses in  which 
firms  may  view  themselves  as  credit  constrained.  Some  firms-  -those 
classified  as bad and some of those classified  as OK-  -simply do  not receive 
credit.  They  cannot obtain credit at  any terms. 
Others-  -the  good firms  rhat  have been classified  as  OK--cannot  get 
credit at terms which  they think is fair.  They im  that  they are going to 
repay.  Thus,  they view the expected cost  of a loan charging  a very high 
interest  rate  to be very high--far  higher than does the OK borrower,  who 
knows  that there  is  a higher  probability of default.  The irony is that the 
cost to good borrowers  is  higher  than  the  cost  (in  terms  of  expected 
payments)  to  lousy  borrowers.  Good borrowers  may  choose  not  to borrow 
anything  at  these  unfavorable  terms.  They  think  of  themselves  as 
effectively  shut out of the market.  This  is similar  to the feeling a small 
business  has when it  has  been turned down  for a loan by its bank.  There are 
secondary  sources to  which  it could turn.  There  is a  market  specialized in 
screening  loan applicants  that have been turned  down by  banks.  When  these 
institutions grant a loan, they charge a  high  interest rate-  -exorbitant  from 
the  perspective  of  the  misclassified  customer,  but  perhaps  accurately 
reflecting  the true default probabilities.  (Some of these individuals  are, 
in  fact, good risks.) The point, of  course, is that the credit market is  not 
a pure-price  market.  It classifies borrowers.  The classification  is the 
central allocstive  mechanism in this market. 
Finally,  the  recognition  of  the  increased  likelihood  of 
misclassification  means  that good borrowers  think  it more likely  that  they 
will be credit  constrained  (in either of the  two senses  in  which  we have 
27 used  the term)  in the  future, and this concern induces them to maintain  a 
more liquid position (invest less.) 
These  are  all  reasons why,  even  if the supply  of credit  today  were 
unaltered by increased uncertainty, investment would be reduced. 
Further, however, banks  do reduce the supply of credit, for reasons that we 
have already  teferred to.  The greater likelihood  of  misclassification  and 
the higher  probabilities  of bankruptcy make loans riskier,  even  if the bank 
is able to increase the interest rate charged to offset.  But the bank  may 
find it disadvantageous  to increase the interest rate charged, because doing 
so  lowers the expected return.  (These effects are in  addition  to the one to 
which we previously  referred, the reduced equity base of  banks  leading to a 
lower willingness to  make loans.) 
The lower supply of  credit means that more of  those classified  as "OK" 
are  denied  credit,  or have their  loan  size  reduced.  And chis,  in turn, 
lowers investment. 
The reduction  in  credit has  further multiplier  effects on credit 
availability.  While  there  are  some  instances  where  non-bank credit  may 
serve as a substitute  for bank credit, in  other cases  the two may  better  be 
looked at as complements.  The  reduction  in bank  credit--the  refusal of a 
bank to make a  loan--leads  to a reluctance  on  the part  of other  lenders to 
extend  credit. 
The increased risk, lower net equity  levels, and greater likelihood  of 
future credit rationing all lead firms to reduce their lending activity. 
We can then trsce out fourth round and subsequent effects:  the reduced 
credit  availability leads to reduced investment, leading to 
28 IV.  Empirical Implications 
The  theory  we  have  presented  has  a  large  number  of  empirical 
implications, which  can be compared both  with  those of traditional Keynesian 
theory,  including  the  fixed  price  and  menu cost  versions,  and the  real 
business  cycles which  have become  fashionable in the US in  recent years.  In 
a  recent  Brookings  paper,  Bruce  Greenwald  and I  (Greenwald  and Stiglitz, 
l988c)  identified  certain  key properties  of  labor,  capital,  and product 
markets which would enable us to distinguish  among the alternative  theories. 
Many  of  the  key  empirical  observations  were  either  inconsistent  or 
unexplained  by the other  theories.  Using  this  "crucial"  tests approach to 
choosing  among  alternative  theories,  our  conclusions  was  that  the  New 
Keynesian  theories,  in  particular  those  versions  focusing  on  the 
consequences  of  imperfect  information  and  incomplete  markets,  won  hands 
down. 
Here I have  only  time to  provide a couple of  examples,  to give a flavor 
of the argument. 
(a)  Inventories.  The  cyclical  behavior  of  inventories  have  long 
provided  a puzzle  for neoclassical and Keynesian  economists.  With concave 
production  functions,  relative  little  variability  in real interest rates, 
and shadow  wages2°  falling  markedly  in recessions,  inventories  should be 
used to smooth  production.  Yet they do not;  if anything,  they exhibit an 
even more  marked  cyclical variability  than  output, and there  is a general 
20Shadow  wages  reflect  the  underutilization  of labor  in recessions, 
evidenced  by cyclical  movements  in productivity.  The discrepancy  between 
marginal  real  (producer)  wages  in booms  and  recessions  is  particularly 
pronounced  if  one takes into account over time pay prevalent  at  later stages 
of  economic recoveries. 
29 consensus  that  they contribute  to economic volatility,  rather  than aerving 
as a buffer-stabilizing  force. 
Our analysis provides  an  explanation of  this behavior. 
(b) Sectoral Patterns.  Traditional  Keynesian  theories,  relying on the 
iaportance of fixed prices, would  seem to predict  that fluctuations  should 
be  smaller  in  those  sectors  exhibiting  flexible  prices.  Among  the  most 
competitive  sectors  of the  economy is the home construction  industry,  yet 
this is a sector which  has experienced  some of the most  marked  volatility. 
Equity  and credit  rationing  are particular  important  in these sectora,  and 
thus  the magnitude  of these  fluctuations  is perfectly  consistent  with our 
views. 
(c)  Explanations  of  price and wage  rigidities.  Traditional  Keynesian 
theories, while  stressing  the importance of  price and wage rigidities, have 
not come up with  convincing explanations of these rigidities, or of why they 
should  be more  important  in  some  sectors  than in others.  The  implicit 
contract  literature,  for instance, while  explaining  why wages paid may not 
exhibit  much variability,  has  been  unsuccessful  in  explaining  why  the 
particular  form of wage rigidity associated with implicit  contracts  should 
give  rise  to unemployment.  (See Newbery  and  Stiglitz,  1987  or Stiglitz 
1986.)  While menu cost models have stressed the importance of  the costs  of 
adjusting  prices,  they  have  failed  to  take  into  account  the  much  larger 
coats associated with adjusting quantities,  and the problem to be explained 
is why it  is, when faced with certain disturbances,  firms seem  more  willing 
to make  quantity  adjustments  than price  adjustments.  An extension  of our 
analysis,  focusing  on  the  differential  risk  associated  with different 
adjustments, has provided  an  explanation not only of why prices may  be more 
30 rigid  than  quantities,  hut  also  why  the  extent  of price  rigidities  may 
differ in different  sectors.  (See below and Greenwald  and Stiglitz,  l988b 
for a more  extensive  discussion.) 
V. Covernment Policy 
The  theory we have described  provides both a rationale  for government 
policy and an  explanation of  the mechanisms through which  it operates. 
Interest  rates  do  not  work as  an  equilibrating  mechanism.  The 
multiplier  processes  we have described  in the previous  section may lead to 
instabilities.  If more credit  is extended than would  be in "equilibrium" 
there  is  an  excess  demand  for  goods;  prices  rise;  there  are  fewer 
bankruptcies;  equity positions are better than anticipated, leading to still 
higher  demands  for  investment.  Though  the higher  than anticipated  price 
level means  that banks'  net equity positions, in  real terms, may actually be 
worse,  in spite  of the  lower  default rate,  the seeming lower  riskiness  of 
lending  more  than  offsets  the  "wealth" effect  21,  leading  to still  more 
investment. 
The  opposite  side-  -an insufficient supply of credit  cascading  into  a 
credit crisis-  -is perhaps an even  more familiar story. 
We  emphasized  earlier how the credit allocation decisions  are made in 
a  decentralized  manner.  We  have  noted  that  in  the  absence  of  the 
coordinating  function usually performed by  interest rates,  there appears  to 
be a role for  a Central  Bank,  to ensure  that the number  of  certifications 
21  Banks  may be slow in calculating  their real  equity  position;  they 
may be fooled by the higher  than expected nominal wealth. 
31 for credit  worthiness  correspond  to  che number  required  to maintain  full 
employment. 
The mechanisms  by which  policy works  should be clear from  the previous 
discussion.  Again,  we have  noted  that  monetary  authorities  may  affect 
either  banks'  willingness  or ability  to lend.  The latter  effect  is,  of 
course,  the  one  upon which  traditional  monetary  theory  has  focused;  but 
while  Keynesian  analysis traces  the effect  through  the indirect route--the 
lower  supply  of  loans  leading  to higher interest  rates  leading  to less 
investment-  - in periods of  credit rationing, we would  argue for a more direct 
channel. 
If  our theory  is correct, the long standing confusion  about whether  it 
is money  or credit through  which  monetary  policy functions  becomes  more 
understandable.  For the traditional mechanism  by which banks  issue credit 
is  intimately  associated  with the  creation  of money.  A credit  line  is 
created.  The  firm draws  upon  the  credit line  when funds  are needed;  a 
demand  deposit--that  is money--is created precisely  when the firm plans  to 
spend more, e.g. by  undertaking  a new investment. 
Our views also  reconcile some of  the controversies  between monetarists, 
Keynesians,  and neoclassical economists.  We agree with  the monetarists  that 
monetary policy  may not primarily work through an interest rate mechanism-- 
and that  interest  rates msy not  provide a good target  for monetary policy 
(except  to the  extent  that  interest  rates  are  correlated  with  inflation 
rates, through Fisher's law.)  But we  agree with the Keynesians that a major 
channel of monetary policy  is through its effects on investment and firm's 
willingness  and  ability  to produce.  Our  view differs  from  monetarists, 
Keynesisns,  end neoclassical  economists  in its view of the details  of how 
32 monetary  policy  affects  the  economy:  it  is not through  a  transactions 
mechanism  (money burning  a hole  in people's pocket, driving them out to buy 
goods  or driving down the interest rate), but through the credit mechanism. 
Some Questions 
A long standing puzzle  facing  conventional monetary  economics is that, 
while  it assumes  that  the government  may control the nominal money  supply, 
it does not control the real money supply.  If the classical dichotomy were 
correct,  an increase  in the money  supply would instantaneously  lead to an 
increase in  prices, negating  the effect of the monetary expansion.22 
The  traditional  Keynesian  way  of resolving  this  is simply  to  assume 
price  rigidities.  We have  already  noted  that  the  recent work trying  to 
justify this in terms of menu  costs-  -the costs of  changing prices-  -seem moat 
unpersuasive.  Again,  it seems  an instance of  macro-economists  focusing  on 
third  or fourth  order  effects.  Surely, these  adjustment  costs  are  of an 
order  of magnitude  smaller  than  the  costs  of adjustments  associated  with 
quantities.  If our objective  is to  explain why the economy adjusts more in 
terms of quantities  than prices, we  have to look elsewhere. 
As we have  observed, our theory provides an  explanation of the relative 
rigidity of  prices as well.  For if firms are risk averse  (as they will  be, 
22Although  again  it is possible to argue that monetary policy-  -defined 
as a rule which  specifies  the magnitudes  by which  the nominal money  supply 
will be  increased  in  indifferent  circumstances--will  have  real  effects, 
because  the probability  distribution  of returns to holding  financial assets 
will thereby change,  this effect  is generally viewed to be a second  order 
effect.  See Stiglitz  (1983). 
33 with  either principal  agent probleaa or if firma are equity constrained)  and 
if  there  is  instrument  uncertainty,  that  is,  uncertainty  about  the 
consequences of a change  in any action, then the extent to  which a variable 
will he adjusted will depend both on  the degree of risk aversion and on  the 
uncertainty of its effect. 
The  risk associated  with  reducing  production  is  relatively  little, 
particularly  if (as Bob Hall has  argued) marginal  costa  of production  are 
constant,  or decrease  or increase only alightly.  For what is entailed  is 
basically  an  intertemporal  aubatitution  of production,  which,  under  the 
stipulated  conditions,  has  relatively little  coats.  The  sole risk is that 
of  a  stock-out  of  inventories,  and  given  the  availability  of  excess 
resources,  remedial  actions  can quickly  be taken  to avoid  that should it 
prove  imminent.  On the other hand, there  is considerable risk associated 
with  changing  prices  and  wages,  partly  associated  with  how  others 
(competitora, employees) will  reapond. 
Unleaa firma  are perfectly  informed concerning  the money  supply,  and 
unless  they  all  believe,  with  coaplete  confidence,  in  the  classical 
dichotomy,  firma will not increase prices  proportionately  in response to an 
increase  in  money  supply.  And,  in this sense, their lack  of  confidence  in 
the claaaical  dichotomy is self-confirming. 
Accordingly,  a monetary-credit  expansion  will  have real effects,  even 
if  all  contracts  were  fully  indexed.  For  so  long  as  prices  do  not 
instantaneously  increase  in proportion  to the credit/money creation,  access 
to  resources will  be altered by a change in nominal credit availability. 
In  particular  monetary  policy  affects  different  sectors  of  the  econoay 
differently.  If the government  were  to make credit more available,  it is 
34 not  as if each  firm in the  economy  immediately  had  its  deposit  accounts 
increased  proportionately.  Some  sectors  are  more  credit  rationed  than 
others.  The  increased credit availability will accordingly  affect  relative 
prices,  and  this will lead to all  the  kinds  of effects  described  in our 
previous discussion. 
Of  course,  there  is  not  full  indexing.  Our  theory  provides  an 
explanation  of why unanticipated  inflation--or  an  unanticipated decrease  in 
the  rate  of  inflation--will  have  even stronger  real  effects,  given  that 
there  is  not  complete  indexing.  Since,  both at  the  time  of the  Great 
Depression  as well as today, there is  not complete indexing, one might argue 
that  this  proviso  is not  of much moment.  But purists  might  claim  that, 
until  we have explained  the  absence  of  indexing,  we have an  incomplete 
theory.  But our  theory  even provides a suggestion  of  why indexing may not 
occur. 
Assume  there were some, say,  oligopolistic  industry in  which all firms 
believe  that  other  firms  do not adjust  their  prices  fully  in response  to 
inflation.  If  each firm believes  the others will  not do so,  it does not pay 
for  it to do  so:  one  can  show there  exists  a  rational  expectations 
equilibrium with  nominal rigidities.  (It would  be  excessively  risky for any 
firm  to  depart  from  the  seeming  convention,  to  try  to  establish  a new 
convention.)  Such  firms  will  be unwilling  to borrow  or  lend with fully 
indexed  bonds.  And other  suppliers  and purchasers  would  not want fully 
indexed bonds,  and would  not change  their prices  proportionately  to changes 
in the money  supply.23  This does not explain why there isn't more indexing- 
23Several  other  models,  based  on imperfect  information, with  nominal 
wage and price rigidities,  have been formulated.  See Stiglitz (1984,  1987a, 
1989) 
35 -although it should be noted  that in economies  in which  inflation rates  are 
high and variable,  indexing does occur.  Indexing clearly does not resolve 
all the relevant macro-economic  issues:  such economies  still  seem subject 
to macro-economic  fluctuations, and  monetary policy may still be  effective. 
Again,  our theory provides  an  explanation2 
,  an explanation which  is  missing 
from traditional  Keynesian  theories which rely  on  nominal price  rigidities. 
Further implications for Policy 
Let me  conclude  my talk by drawing attention  to three  of the  policy 
implications of  our theory. 
1.  Social va. Private Returns to  Increasing Speed of  Recording  Transactions. 
One major  change  in recent decades, to which we have referred earlier, 
is the  faster  speed  with which  transactions  are recorded.  We emphasized 
earlier  the importance  of having  a good accounting  system- 
-  this was one of 
the  central  roles  of banking  institutions.  But  it does  not  follow  that 
there  is much of a social  return  to  recording  a transaction  one  second 
faster, though given the conventions of our accounting system,  there may be 
a private  return  from doing  so.  Elsewhere  (Stiglitz and Weiss  [19881), we 
24Lest  we claim  too much for our  theory, it should be noted that we 
show that  there  exist  Nash  equilibrium  exhibiting  nominal  price  or wage 
rigidities  (Stiglitz  l985b,  1987a,b); there  are other  equilibria  which  do 
not  exhibit these nominal rigidities, but show real rigidities.  We do not 
explain how it  is that a particular equilibrium  is "aelected."  This  may  be 
asking too much of  a theory:  the explanation may simply lie in history. 
36 have ahown  that expenditures  on such increases  in  speed  in recording may be 
welfare decreasing. 
2.  Incidence of  the Corporation Income Tax 
Our  theory has emphasized  the importance  of equity  constraints  and the 
availability  of funds.  Covernment  policies  affect  not  only  the maerginal 
return  to,  say,  investment,  but  also  the supply  of funds  within  a  firm. 
Accordingly,  the incidence of the corporation  tax may depend on average tax 
rates as well  as  marginal  tax rates.25 
3.  Stabilization  Policy 
We have noted  the  importance  of  equity and credit  rationing  in business 
fluctuations.  An effective stabilization policy of  the government  should be 
directed  at overcoming  the limitations of this rationing.  We can think  of 
standard investment  tax credits as grants to firms, grants which  are cut off 
as soon  as firms profits become  too low.  But those are ptecisely the times 
when  the  firm  needs  funds  the most.  Covernment  policy  exacerbates  the 
limitations  of  financial  markets,  rather  than  offsetting  them.  The 
government's  ability to tax implies that loans made thtough the tax system 
have  somewhat  different properties  than loans made  by banks;  moreover,  the 
objectives  of government  loans  should  be somewhat  different  from  those  of 
banks,  which  are  only concerned  with  the  returns  they  can  obtain.  The 
government  is,  after  all,  a  silent  partner  in all business  enterprises,  a 
partner,  however  with  somewhat  different  terms  than  those  facing  other 
25See Creenwald and Stiglitz (l988a). 
37 partners.  I  emphasize  these  differences  because  I  wish to  avoid  the 
objection:  won't government  funds simply displace private funds? 
The importance of  discrimination-  -of ensuring that funds to go to good 
investment  projects- 
-  is  sufficiently  great  to make a  government  program 
without screening  likely  to be socially unprofitable.  The difficulties  of 
ascertaining  credit  worthiness  are  sufficiently  great  to make  government 
screening  either  excessively  bureaucratic  or  particularly  vulnerable  to 
corruption.  This is why one needs  to look  for self-selection schemes, where 
those  who  have  good prospects  (as  evidenced,  for  instance,  by  their 
willingness  to put up their own capital) seek funds.  Though  this is not 
the occasion  to provide  s detailed  proposal, a system whereby  firms  could 
borrow limited amounts for new investment (say 10% of  the capital cost), to 
be repaid  out of future  earnings would  ease the capital constraint  and,  if 
the loans were  made at  sufficiently favorable terms, increase the returns so 
as to encourage  investment during slack times. 
Concluding Remarks 
I began this lecture somewhat in  the spirit of  'the true confessions of 
a converted monetarist."  By now, it should be clear  that my  conversion has 
been far from complete.  I  remain skeptical of  the relevance of the  'M" so 
loved  both by Keynesian  and monetarist  economists.  Money  as a medium  of 
exchange  is,  if not irrelevant,  close  to being  so.  It is not money  that 
makes  the  world go  around, but  credit.  It is not easy  to describe  the 
supply and demand  for  credit,  its creation and  destruction.  One  can not 
38 simply  write  down a  production  function.  The  process  of  judging  credit 
worthiness  involves the collection and processing  of information; changes in 
economic  circumstances  can  easily  destroy  the  relevance  of  previously 
accumulated  information. 
The  close  links  between the  money  supply  and credit  creation  have 
naturally  caused  a  confusion  between  the  two.  If money  creation  were 
perfectly  linked  with  credit  creation,  one  might  well  object  to  the 
traditional stories told about how money affects the economy; but the policy 
implications  might  not  be  far  from  the mark  (so long  as  one used money 
supply as the  target  variable,  not  an intermediate  variable,  such  as the 
rate  of  interest.)  But  the  link  is  far  from  perfect,  and  changes  in 
institutions,  technology,  and policy can affect  that link.  Our  monetary 
institutions become  one,  important set of institution within  a broader  met 
of  institutions  to provide  credit,  monitor  loans,  and,  more  broadly,  to 
facilitate  intertemporal  transactions.  I hope that I  provided  here an 
alternative  framework  within which  we  can begin to think  systematically 
about monetary policy  and credit institutions from  this broader perspective. 
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